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Following a recession, the aggregate labor market is slack – employment remains below normal and
recruiting efforts of employers, as measured by vacancies, are low. A model of matching frictions
explains the qualitative responses of the labor market to adverse shocks, but requires implausibly
large shocks to account for the magnitude of observed fluctuations. The incorporation of wage-
setting frictions vastly increases the sensitivity of the model to driving forces. I develop a new model
of wage friction. The friction arises in an economic equilibrium and satisfies the condition that no
worker-employer pair has an unexploited opportunity for mutual improvement. The wage friction
neither interferes with the efficient formation of employment matches nor causes inefficient job loss.









Modern economies experience substantial fluctuations in aggregate output and 
employment. In recessions, employment falls and unemployment rises. In the years 
immediately after a recession, the labor market is slack—unemployment remains high and 
the vacancy rate and other measures of employer recruiting effort are abnormally low. 
Unemployment is determined by the rate at which workers lose jobs and the rate at which 
the unemployed find jobs. I develop a model of fluctuations embodying both matching and 
wage frictions. The incorporation of a wage friction makes employment realistically 
sensitive to driving forces. My characterization of the wage friction is rather different from 
earlier ideas of wage rigidity and more closely integrated with the matching process. The 
model with both wage and matching frictions describes an economic equilibrium and 
overcomes the arbitrary disequilibrium character of earlier sticky-wage models. 
A line of research starting with Diamond [1982], Mortensen [1982], and Pissarides 
[1985]—nicely summarized in Pissarides’s [2000] book and in Shimer [2003]—provides 
an account of unemployment as a productive use of time. I adopt many of the elements of 
their model—the DMP model—in this paper. The DMP model views the labor market in 
terms of an economic equilibrium where workers and employers interact purposefully. A 
friction in matching unemployed workers to recruiting employers accounts for the 
existence of unemployment. Variations in the economic environment lead to fluctuations 
in unemployment. The DMP model portrays wage determination as a Nash bargain, where 
employers receive a constant fraction of the match surplus. The payoff to recruiting 
activity—the employers’ share of the surplus—is not very sensitive to driving forces. 
Hence the DMP model cannot explain the magnitude of movements in recruiting activity. 
In reality, the labor market slackens substantially in recessions and workers encounter   2 
difficulty in finding jobs, but the DMP model with Nash-bargain wage determination 
suggests stability in job-finding rates under plausible variations in the driving forces. 
In a model with matching frictions, the bargaining set for wage determination is 
relatively wide, because the difficulty in locating matches creates match capital the 
moment a tentative match is made. The value of the match capital determines the gap 
between the minimum wage acceptable to the worker and the maximum wage acceptable 
to the employer. From the perspective of bilateral bargaining theory in general, any wage 
within the bargaining set could be an outcome of the bargain. The Nash bargain sets the 
wage at a weighted average of the limiting wages, with a fixed weight over time. The 
alternative I offer permits variations over time in the position of the wage within the 
bargaining set. When the wage is relatively high—closer to the employer’s maximum—the 
employer anticipates less of the surplus from new matches and puts correspondingly less 
effort into recruiting workers. Jobs become hard to find, unemployment rises, and 
employment falls.  
In the wage-friction model I develop, when changes in the economic environment 
shift the boundaries of the bargaining set, at first the wage remains close to constant. Then 
the wage adjusts over time because—thanks to heterogeneity in matches—the wage in 
some cases falls outside the bargaining set and is then moved to the boundary of the set. 
This mechanism guarantees that wage rigidity never results in an allocation of labor that is 
inefficient from the joint perspective of worker and employer. Consequently, the model 
provides a full answer to Barro’s [1977] condemnation of sticky-wage models for invoking 
an inefficiency that intelligent actors could easily avoid. Unlike frictions portrayed as 
essentially arbitrary restrictions on the ability to set wages or prices—such as in Calvo’s 
[1983] well-known model for prices—the friction considered here arises within an 
economic equilibrium. It satisfies the criterion that no employer-worker pair foregoes 
bilateral opportunities for mutual improvement. 
Although wage rigidity has no effect on the formation of a job match once worker 
and employer meet and no effect on the continuation of the match, rigidity does have a   3 
profound influence on the search process. If wages are toward the upper end of the 
bargaining set, the incentives that employers face to look for additional workers are low. I 
start the paper with evidence about the remarkably strong procyclical movements of help-
wanted advertising and vacancies. This evidence supports the mechanism proposed here. 
I then turn to the model. I adopt the matching friction of the DMP model. But as 
Shimer [2003] and Veracierto [2002] have stressed, the DMP model and others with the 
same basic view of the labor market do not offer a plausible explanation of observed 
fluctuations in unemployment. The magnitude of changes in driving forces needed to 
account for the rise in unemployment and decline in recruiting effort during slumps is 
much too large to fit the facts about the U.S. economy. For this reason—and following 
Shimer’s suggestion—I introduce the wage friction into the DMP setup. The resulting 
model makes recruiting effort, job-finding rates, and unemployment remarkably sensitive 
to changes in determinants. A small decline in the product price, productivity, or increase 
in input prices results in a slump in the labor market. With the wage friction, these changes 
depress employers’ returns to recruiting substantially. The offsetting decline in the wage 
that occurs instantly in the DMP model is delayed by the wage friction. The immediate 
effect is a decline in recruiting efforts, a lower job-finding rate, and a slacker labor market 
with higher unemployment. 
II.  Variations in Recruiting Effort 
The DMP model captures recruiting effort in the vacancy rate. Prior to the 
beginning of the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) in December 2000, 
no direct measures of vacancies have been available for the U.S. labor market. Previous 
authors have suggested—reasonably persuasively—that data on help-wanted advertising 
provided good evidence about variations in vacancies over time. Figure 1 shows the 
Conference Board’s index of help-wanted advertising since 1951. Recruiting effort as   4 
measured by advertising is remarkably volatile. It is not uncommon for advertising to fall 





















































































































Figure 1. Index of Help-Wanted Advertising 
Source: The Conference Board, http://www.globalindicators.org 
Table 1 shows data from JOLTS on vacancies by industry for the period of 
slackening of the labor market since late 2000. The figures confirm the high volatility of 
vacancies suggested by the data on help-wanted advertising. The data show that vacancies 
have declined in almost all industries. Although the forces that caused the downturn in the 
economy disproportionately affected a few industries far more than others—notably 
computers, software, and telecommunications equipment—the softening of the labor 
market was economy-wide. The new data strongly confirm the position of Abraham and 
Katz [1986] that recessions are times when the labor markets of almost all industries   5 
slacken—not times when workers move from industries with slack markets to others with 
tight markets. I conclude that a realistic model of the labor market needs to invoke a 
market-wide force that has powerful effects on the recruiting efforts of employers. 
Industry Ratio  of 
vacancy rates in 





Transportation and utilities  0.80 
Wholesale trade  0.52 
Retail trade  0.60 
Finance, insurance, and real estate  0.79 
Services 0.68 
Federal government  0.54 
State and local government  0.70 
Table 1. Change in Vacancy Rates by Industry in JOLTS, December 2000 to December 2002 
III.  Model of the Labor Market  
A.  The Matching Process and Recruiting Effort 
I adopt the standard view of the matching friction in the labor market. The flow of 
candidate matches results from the application of a constant-returns matching technology 
to vacancies, v , and unemployment, u (both are expressed as ratios to the labor force). Let 
x be the ratio of vacancies to unemployment and let  () x φ  be the per-period probability   6 




ρ =  be the per-period probability that 
an employer will fill a vacancy. φ  is an increasing function and ρ  is a decreasing 
function. Employers open vacancies and initiate the recruiting process whenever it is 
profitable to do so.  
The vacancy/unemployment ratio, x, serves as the indicator of labor-market 
conditions in the model. In a tight market with a high ratio of vacancies to unemployment, 
the unemployed find it easy to locate new jobs, so the job-finding rate  () x φ  is high. 
Employers find it difficult to locate new workers, so the job-filling rate  () x ρ  is low. The 
matching model gives a precise meaning to the notion of tight and slack markets.  
A standard specification for the matching technology is 
  () xx α φω =    (3.1) 
The parameter ω controls the efficiency of matching and the parameter α  splits the 
variation between changes in job-finding rates and changes in job-filling rates. The 
underlying matching function gives an elasticity of α  to vacancies and 1 α −  to 
unemployment. 
B. Separations 
For simplicity, I assume a fixed hazard, s, that a job will end. In the U.S. labor 
market, separations that result in unemployment appear to rise somewhat when 
unemployment rises, but separations involving direct re-employment in new jobs decline. 
JOLTS measures the sum of the two flows; the sum rose moderately from December 2000 
through the most recently reported data. The situation is further complicated by the flows 
into unemployment of people who were previously out of the labor force and the flows of 
unemployed people back out of the labor force (see Blanchard and Diamond [1990]). My   7 
model in its present form does not claim to do justice to these aspects of labor-market 
dynamics. 
It is straightforward to extend the model to make separations endogenous. The key 
properties considered here would not be altered by that extension. Because the U.S. has a 
well-defined Beveridge curve, nicely traced out by the data from JOLTS and the 
unemployment survey for the contraction that began in early 2001, separations cannot be 
too sensitive to driving forces, else the model would be unable to explain the high 
amplitude of variations in vacancies documented in Table 1. Higher separations in slack 
markets would require higher vacancies to maintain stochastic equilibrium in the market 
and this influence could flatten the Beveridge curve unrealistically (see Shimer [2003]). 
In addition to ruling out endogenous movements of the separation rate, my 
assumption also rules out exogenous movements. That is, I do not take spontaneous 
fluctuations in the separation rate as a driving force in the model. A spontaneous burst of 
separations raises both unemployment and vacancies and shifts the Beveridge curve 
outward. The stability of the Beveridge curve argues against the importance of such a 
driving force (see Abraham and Katz [1986]). 
C. Equilibrium  with  Matching Friction 
The following is derived fairly directly from Pissarides [2000] and Shimer [2003]. I 
use discrete time to facilitate computations. I let λ be the value a worker enjoys when 
searching (leisure value and unemployment compensation). The price of output is  t p . 
Other inputs needed to produce the unit of output cost c. And it costs k in recruiting costs 
to hold a vacancy open for one period. Workers and firms are risk-neutral and discount the 
future at rate β . 
The model is conveniently specified in terms of Bellman value-transition equations. 
Let  t U  be the value a worker associates with being unemployed and searching for a new 
job and let  t E  be the value the worker associates with being in a job, after receiving that 
period’s wage payment,  t w . Let  t J  be the value the employer associates with a filled job   8 
after making the wage payment. I assume, as is standard in this literature, that employers 
expand recruiting effort to the point of zero profit, so the value associated with an unfilled 
vacancy is zero.  
The value transition equations are: 
  () ( ) () () () 11 11 1 tt t t t t t Ux w E x U βφ φ λ ++ ++  =+ + − +   (3.2) 
  () () () 11 11 1 tt t t t Es E w s U βλ ++ ++  =− ++ +   (3.3) 
  () () 11 1 1 tt t t t Js J p c w β ++ + =− +− −  (3.4) 
  () ( ) 11 1 0 tt t tt xJ p cw k βρ ++ + =+ − − −  (3.5) 
Conditional on the wage,  t w , and future values of other variables, the first three 
equations determine the current values of  ,  , and  tt t UE J . Equation (3.5) captures a central 
aspect of the model: Given the anticipated payoff from making a match, 
11 11 tt tt Jp c w ++ ++ +− −, firms create vacancies up to the point where the payoff is canceled 
by the recruiting cost, k. As they create more vacancies,  t x  rises, recruiting success,  () t x ρ  
falls, and the point of zero net payoff is achieved. This pins down the key variable,  t x , the 
vacancy/unemployment ratio.  
D. Wage  Determination 
Here I depart from the DMP model, which views wage determination as the 
outcome of a Nash bargain. In this model, a worker with a reservation wage 
wU E λ =+ −is matched with an employer with a reservation wage wJpc =+− . The 
symmetric Nash bargain would be the average of the two values. Instead, I characterize   9 
wage determination in terms of a Nash [1953] demand game or auction (see also Chatterjee 
and Samuelson [1983] and Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983]). In the auction, worker and 
employer know one another’s reservation values. The worker proposes a wage,  L w , and 
the firm, without knowing the worker’s proposal, makes its own proposal, H w . If 
LH ww ≤ , the match is made or continues and the wage is agreed to be 
() 1 LH ww w κκ =+ −  with 01 κ << . The auction has the property that any  w in the 
bargaining set [] , ww is a Nash equilibrium. Believing that the worker is bidding  L w , the 
firm will bid  L w  as well, provided that  L ww ≤ . Similarly, believing that the firm is 
bidding  H w , the worker will bid  H w  as well, provided  H ww ≤ . Thus any 
[] , LH ww w w w ==∈  is a Nash equilibrium. Nash proposed the celebrated equilibrium 
selection rule—the Nash bargain—adopted in the DMP model. 
I specify a different equilibrium selection rule to pin down the wage within the 
bargaining set. The basic idea is that the previous period’s wage sets the norm for this 
period’s wage. Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry [1996] discuss this type of a wage norm and 
Bewley [1999] provides evidence about the operation of a modern labor market under such 
a norm. Those authors focus on the avoidance of downward wage adjustments, but many 
of their ideas point toward the absence of immediate upward wage adjustments as well. My 
specification is limited in a way not previously considered in the literature on wage 
rigidity—I do not permit the norm to lie outside the bargaining set. The earlier work 
implied inefficient outcomes, especially the loss of a job under conditions where both 
worker and employer could have been better off with a wage adjustment. The wage norm I 
consider interferes neither with the formation of efficient matches once the parties are in 
touch with one another nor with the preservation of jobs with positive surplus. Inefficient 
separations cannot occur. As a result, the model provides a full answer to Barro’s [1977] 
indictment of sticky wage models for invoking unexplained inefficiencies in economic 
arrangements.   10 
In the simplest application of the idea, the wage would remain at its previous level 
as long as that level remained within the bargaining set. From a starting point where the 
wage is in the middle of the bargaining set, and for moderate disturbances that do not move 
the boundaries of the bargaining set past that wage, the wage simply remains fixed. 
Strict fixity of the wage is not a reasonable property for a dynamic model. To 
formulate a more realistic version with gradual wage adjustment, I introduce heterogeneity 
into the model. Suppose that each wage bargain contains an idiosyncratic random shift, η , 
in the boundaries of the bargaining set, so that the set becomes [] , ww ηη ++ . The 























I take the norm to be  () () 11 tt wE w η −− = , the previously determined average of wages. The 
selection rule moves the wage to the boundary of the bargaining set in cases where either 
changes in  t w  or  t w , or the draw of η  imply that the norm would lie outside the 
bargaining set.
1 These adjustments move the norm over time toward the middle of the 
interval [] , ww.  
For newly hired workers, the process works in the following way: A value of η  is 
drawn. If the norm,  1 t w − , is inside the bargaining set [] , tt ww ηη ++ , the worker starts the 
job at wage  1 t w − ; otherwise, the wage is  t w η + , if η  is so high that  1 t w −  is below the 
                                                 
1 Thomas and Worrall [1988] develop a similar wage-setting rule. In their model, a worker and a firm 
generate a potential surplus if the firm can insure the worker against wage fluctuations. But the worker and 
firm cannot commit to continue the relationship. Hence the wage is confined to the interval defined by the 
current bargaining set. The optimal rule is to change the wage only when it would otherwise fall outside the 
bargaining set, in order to shield the worker from wage fluctuations. The paper does not include a resolution 
of the initial indeterminacy of the wage—the subject of my work—nor does it include volatility of 
unemployment, which does not exist in the model.   11 
lower boundary of the bargaining set, or  t w η + , if η  is so low that  1 t w −  is above the upper 
boundary of the bargaining set. In subsequent periods, new draws of η  occur and the wage 
is the current norm  1 t w −  if it lies inside the bargaining set or is adjusted to the boundary of 
the bargaining set. 
I assume that η  is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ . 
Let F be its cumulative distribution and f  its density and note that  
  () ()
2
x
fd f x ηη ησ
−∞
= ∫ . (3.7) 
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Figure 2 shows the relation of the new wage  t w  to the earlier 1 t w − . I have exaggerated the 
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic element and thus overstated the rate of adjustment. 
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Figure 2. Wage Adjustment Function 
The wage-adjustment function can be expressed in the form  
  () () () 1, , , , * ww w w w w w w w χχ ′ =− + . (3.9) 






=  (3.10) 
is the symmetric Nash bargain wage rate. In a standard partial-adjustment model, the rate 
would be a constant. Here, adjustment is more rapid near the boundaries of the bargaining 
set than in the middle and more rapid if the boundaries are closer together.    13 
E. Equilibrium 
The model is a difference equation in reverse time. From values of  1 t U + ,  1 t E + ,  1 t J + , 
1 t w + , and  t x , equations (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) give  t U ,  t E , and  t J . These are present 
discounted values formed recursively. Then the zero-profit condition for time t, equation 
(3.5) can be solved for the new value of the vacancy/unemployment ratio,  1 t x − . Finally the 
wage adjustment equation, (3.8), can be solved for  t w  given  1 t w + ,  1 t w + , and  1 t w + . The 
wage is a state variable that starts at an historical value which I take as the stationary 
(symmetric Nash bargain) wage for  1 p = . With an infinite horizon, the values of  1 t U + , 
1 t E + ,  1 t J + , and  1 t w +  would satisfy a transversality condition. To approximate the infinite-
horizon case over a finite period of 10 years, I find the terminal wage and associated 
stationary-state values of  T U ,  T E , and  T J  that satisfy the initial condition for the wage. 
At realistic adjustment rates, this “shooting” problem can be solved easily by trial and 
error. 
To find the resulting paths of unemployment, employment, and vacancies, I iterate 
forward from the given initial unemployment rate. Suppose that the labor force is 
normalized at one. Then the law of motion for employment is: 
  () () 11 1 1 tt t t nx u s n φ −− − =+ −  (3.11) 
and unemployment is: 
  1 tt un =−  .  (3.12) 
The vacancy rate is 
  tt t vx u =  .  (3.13)   14 
IV. Parameters 
To estimate the elasticity of the matching function, α , I use the aggregate data 
from JOLTS shown in Table 2. I calculate x as the ratio of vacancies to unemployment and 
the job-filling rate as the job-finding rate divided by x and estimate the elasticity as the 
change in the log of the job-finding rate divided by the change in the log of the 
vacancy/unemployment ratio, x. The resulting estimate is 0.765.  
  December 2000  December 2002 
New hires  4.070 million  3.187 million 
Unemployed  5.264 million  8.209 million 
Vacancies 4.036  million 2.558  million 
Job-finding rate, φ   0.773 per month  0.388 per month 
Job-filling rate,  ρ   1.008 per month  1.246 per month 
Unemployment rate, u  3.6 percent  5.7 percent 
Vacancy rate, v  2.8 percent  1.8 percent 
x  0.767 vacancies per 
unemployed worker 
0.312 vacancies per 
unemployed worker 
α , elasticity of job finding with 
respect to x 
0.765 
Table 2. Calculations from JOLTS Data 
The model operates at a weekly frequency, to avoid the danger that either the job-
finding rate or the job-filling rate might exceed one. I calibrate to the data shown in Table 
3.   15 
Symbol Concept Value  Source 
φ   Job-finding rate  0.62 per month = 
0.14 per week 
JOLTS and Household 
Survey 
v  Vacancy rate  0.028  JOLTS 
u  Unemployment rate  0.056  Household Survey 
historical average 
Table 3. Data from U.S. Labor Market 
Notice that the value of the vacancy/unemployment ratio, x, is 0.5. I calibrate or estimate 
the parameters as shown in Table 4. 
Parameter Interpretation  Value  Source 
ω   Efficiency of matching  0.212  Calibration 
s   Weekly separation rate   0.00815  Calibration 
λ  
Flow value while searching 
(leisure or unemployment 
compensation) 
0.4 
Corresponds to a flow value while 
searching that is about 75 percent of the 
flow wage 
c  Flow cost of other inputs  0.45  Approximate labor share in revenue in 
typical industry 
k  Flow cost of a vacancy  0.255  Calibration 
β   Discount factor  0.999014  Corresponds to 5 percent annual rate 
σ  
Standard deviation of 
idiosyncratic shift of the 
boundaries of the wage 
bargaining set 
0.23 
Roughly matches persistence of 
unemployment, assuming a random 
walk for price 
Table 4. Calibration and Estimation of Parameters 
I normalize the stationary level of the price, p, to one. The calibration solves the 9 
equations: (3.1) through (3.5) and (3.10) through (3.13). The solution gives the stationary 
values of four endogenous variables: U,  E,  J, and w and three calibrated parameters: 
,  , and   sk ω  (I treat the separation rate, s, as a calibrated parameter even though it can be   16 
found in JOLTS in order to make the stochastic equilibrium condition, equation (3.11) 
without time subscripts, hold exactly). 
The values of the variables are shown in Table 5. 
Variable Interpretation  Value 
U  Value while searching  539.7 
E  Value of future work while 
working  
540.5 
J  Value of worker to the firm   0.91 
w  Wage  0.54 
Table 5. Stationary Values of Endogenous Variables 
V.  Properties of the Model 
A.  The Stationary State 
The model keeps wages essentially constant in the short run. Strict constancy of the 
wage would result in extreme sensitivity of the stationary-state unemployment and 






















Figure 3. Stationary-State Relations among Price and Job Finding, Vacancy, and 
Unemployment Rates, Fixed Wage 
The relations abstracts from transitory dynamics and from effects from changing 
driving forces. At a higher product price in relation to the fixed wage, employers put more 
resources into recruiting because they receive a higher fraction of the surplus. 
Consequently, the job-finding rate is higher and the unemployment rate is lower. 
The curves in Figure 3 display properties that are central to the view of the labor 
market embodied in the model. Although the full model takes account of the aspects of the 
labor market not considered in the figure—matching dynamics and the effects of expected 
future changes in driving forces—the curves tell the main story of the model. If product 
demand is weak, unemployment rises. The rise occurs because the rate of flow out of 
unemployment falls.   18 
The high sensitivity of labor-market conditions to the product price when the wage 
is fixed arises for the following reason: The gross value that an employer achieves from a 
success in recruiting is  
  VJp c w =+− − (3.14) 
Recruiting cost exhausts this value in equilibrium. The response of recruiting effort—and 
therefore of conditions in the labor market—depends on the change in V induced by a 
change in p.  Jp c +− is the present value of the profit margin earned by a worker in the 
course of the job and, with exogenous separation, does not depend on any other variables 
in the model. In the calibration,  1 104.92
dJ
dp
+= . With the wage held constant, there is no 
offset from a wage change and  104.92
dV
dp
= , resulting in large changes in recruiting effort. 
The elasticity of V with respect to p is well over 50, as the level of V is 0.9. By contrast, 
with a symmetric Nash wage bargain, as in the DMP model, almost all of this increased 







= . The price change has little effect on the employer’s gross value and thus 
little effect on recruiting effort. 
The sensitivity of recruiting effort to the product price depends on the distribution 
of rents between workers and employers. If every employer makes take-it-or-leave-it offers 
to its workers and captures all the rent, workers are indifferent between unemployment and 
employment and their wage is the present value of λ for the duration of the job. 
Employers have large incentives to recruit workers at all times, but the elasticity of the 
gross value is unity and the response of recruiting effort to price changes is not very 
elastic. Thus the high amplification of price or productivity shocks that occurs in the model   19 
depends on the assumption that the typical workers shares a significant fraction of the joint 
surplus from the employment relationship. 
B.  Dynamic Response to Permanent Price Shock 
I calculate the responses to a permanent price shock. The price jumps from 1 to 
1+∆ in the first period and remains at the new level. I start the calculations at the 
stationary distribution of the labor force between employment and unemployment (94.4 
percent and 5.6 percent). Figure 4 shows the response of the unemployment and job-
finding rates to a tiny price reduction of 0.1 percent. A standard deviation of the 
idiosyncratic element of wage setting of  0.23 σ =  reproduces the persistence of U.S. 
unemployment, in the sense that unemployment declines to half its maximum level after 30 
months. The thin line that tracks unemployment except at the outset is the stochastic 




 —the unemployment rate that would prevail if the 
job-finding rate remained constant at its current value and the labor market reached 
stochastic equilibrium. The two curves differ materially only for the first few months. 
Except for the period just after a shock, it is safe to interpret the labor market as in 
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Figure 4. Response to Permanent Price Change in the Model with Wage and Matching 
Friction 
As soon as the price drops, the labor market slackens—the job-finding rate falls 
from its normal level just above 14 percent per week to about 12 percent per week. With a 
constant inflow to unemployment and a diminished outflow, unemployment builds rapidly 
to a maximum of about 6.7 percent. The wage moves downward from the start, so the job-
finding rate rises continuously. At about 7 months, improved job finding and higher 
unemployment combine to equate the outflow from unemployment to the exogenous 
inflow and unemployment reaches its maximum. From that point forward, further 
improvements in job finding bring the unemployment rate back down to its new stationary 
value slightly above the old stationary value of 5.6 percent (because the product price is 
permanently 0.1 percent lower). Notice that the overall dynamics of the model are second   21 
order and unemployment overshoots later in the adjustment process, though only slightly. 
At the 10-year cutoff in the figure, unemployment is still a bit below the old stationary 
level of 5.6 percent. 
C.  The Adjustment Rate 
When the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shift of the boundaries of the 
bargaining set is 0.23, the weekly adjustment rate  () ,, www χ  defined in equation (3.9) is 
only 0.00006. The corresponding annual adjustment rate is 0.3 percent. Recessions would 
last almost forever if this rate actually controlled the movement of the wage to its new 
stationary value after a price or productivity shock. But the effective adjustment rate is fast 
enough to generate the response shown in Figure 4. The reason is the extreme sensitivity of 
 and  ww  to the difference between the price and the wage paid. A small decrease in the 
price lowers the job-finding rate and thus lowers the unemployment value, U, that 
determines  w. As discussed earlier, the lower price also lowers the value of the worker to 




respect to p in the stationary state is 255. The response shown in Figure 4 combines a large 
initial downward movement of   and  ww  resulting from the price decline and the tiny 
adjustment rate  () ,, www χ  to generate a realistic movement of the wage and the 
unemployment. Each small adjustment in the wage moves   and  ww  closer by a factor of 
500 toward their new stationary values.  
D.  Comparison to the Same Model with Nash Wage Bargain 
A model in the DMP family can be created by replacing the wage determination 








=  (3.15)   22 
Figure 5 shows the relations between the product price, p, and the job finding, and 
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Figure 5. Stationary-State Relations among Price and Job Finding, Vacancy, and 
Unemployment Rates 
Figure 5 displays the property of the DMP model stressed by Shimer [2003] and 
Veracierto [2002]—large movements in the driving forces are needed to explain observed 
movements in unemployment. In their models, the driving force is productivity. The 
variable p in this model could be interpreted as productivity instead of the product price. In 
addition, responses to changes in input prices would be essentially the same as for product 
prices. A change of several percent in p is required to change unemployment by one 
percentage point. Observed movements in productivity or in price-cost margins are 
typically nowhere near that large.   23 
Figure 6 shows the dynamic responses to a permanent downward price shock of 4 
percent. Unemployment rises rapidly to its new permanently higher level. The job-finding 
rate drops immediately to its new permanent level. The vacancy rate (not shown) moves in 
the same way as the job-finding rate. Except for the transitory dynamics from matching, 
the DMP model lacks the dynamics of the wage-friction model—conditions in the labor 
market, as measured by the job-finding rate, the job-filling rate, or the vacancy rate, move 
immediately to their new stationary levels. In order to generate realistic impulse responses, 
resembling those in Figure 4 for the wage-friction model, the DMP model must invoke 
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Figure 6. Responses in the DMP model to Four-Percent Price Decrease 
Figure 6 confirms that the response functions are unrealistic in an important 
respect—a relatively large impulse is needed to account for the movements of the job-  24 
finding and unemployment rates that occur in a typical recession. The reason is that 
changes in the product price have modest effects on the match surplus, which is 1.84 at p = 
1 and 1.77 at p = 0.96. Employers recruit workers on the expectation of receiving half the 
surplus. Their recruiting efforts do not fall very much with p, so the job-finding rate does 
not fall much either. Unemployment rises relatively little unless the decline in p is large. 
VI.  More Elaborate Wage Norms 
Friedman [1968] and Phelps [1967] launched a rich literature on inertia in wage 
and price determination. They pointed out that the wage determination process would 
probably adapt to persistent inflation and thereby offset the tightening of the labor market 
that a simple model of inertia would predict. Experience in many countries in the ensuing 
three decades generally confirmed this proposition. The wage-adjustment process 
summarized in equation (3.9) could be augmented with a term that raised the wage norm 
by enough each period to incorporate adaptation to persistent inflation.  
This is also an appropriate point to note that the wage-adjustment process is 
sensitive to the units in which wages are set. Equation (3.9) implies quite different 
outcomes if the wage is measured in money terms rather than in real terms. Both 
interpretations are consistent with the underlying idea that wage determination is an 
equilibrium selection issue within the bargaining set implied by the matching model. 
One important branch of the literature following Friedman and Phelps—notably 
Lucas [1972]—associated the inertial element of wage determination with expectations. In 
Lucas’s model, lags in the availability of information resulted in inertia in the sense of 
reliance in part on older information to solve a problem of inference about the current state 
of the economy. Subsequently many practical economists equated the inertial term with 
expected inflation. This view has proven to be something of a straitjacket. The amount of 
inertia implies long lags in the formation of expectations, as if participants in wage   25 
determination were forced to use truly stale information despite the ready availability of 
recent information. The notion that a wage norm adapts gradually to past experience seems 
a more promising way to understand inertia. 
The wage norm also may help understand episodes in wage determination that do 
not fit the expectation view at all. Episodes of discrete, sudden regime change—such as 
those documented by Sargent [1982]—seem to break the connection of wage and price 
determination to history. These episodes do not fit econometric models based on 
expectation formation. The notion of a wage norm is sufficiently flexible to include rapid 
change in times of clear breaks in policy. 
The wage-friction model developed in this paper, based on a wage norm as an 
equilibrium selection mechanism, achieves a strict standard of predictive power in one 
respect—that the wage never falls outside the bargaining set—but is permissive with 
respect to wage-determination mechanisms that keep the wage inside the bargaining set. 
Application of the model in practice needs to be guided by evidence about actual wage 
determination, because theory is unrestrictive apart from the role of the bargaining set. 
VII. Concluding  Remarks 
Strong evidence supports the following view of fluctuations in employment and 
unemployment: When the labor market is tight and unemployment is low, employers 
devote substantial resources to recruiting workers. Job-finding rates for the unemployed 
are high. By contrast, when the market is slack and unemployment is high, employers 
recruit less aggressively and job-finding rates are low. Data on help-wanted advertising, 
vacancies, and unemployment confirm these relations. Further, transitions from strong 
markets with low unemployment and high vacancies to weak markets with high 
unemployment and low vacancies seem to occur without large measurable changes in 
driving forces. Rather, small shocks stimulate large responses of unemployment.   26 
I have offered a model of fluctuations in the labor market that mimics all of these 
properties. In the model, the labor market becomes slack when recent events have lowered 
the benefit to the employer from hiring. These events, such as a small decline in 
productivity or a small rise in input prices, substantially reduce the payoff to hiring during 
the time when wage friction inhibits the offsetting movement of the wage. The friction is 
plausible, because it occurs only within the range where the wage does not block efficient 
bargains from being struck and maintained. The outcome of the bargain between worker 
and employer is fundamentally indeterminate and the wage friction is an equilibrium 
selection mechanism. The friction can be interpreted in terms of a wage norm that provides 
the equilibrium selection function.    27 
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